Augmenting American Fuzzy Lop to Increase the Speed of Bug Detection by Mahajan, Raviraj
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Dissertations School of Computing 
2019 
Augmenting American Fuzzy Lop to Increase the Speed of Bug 
Detection 
Raviraj Mahajan 
Technological University Dublin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/scschcomdis 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mahajan, R. (2019). Augmenting American Fuzzy Lop to Increase the Speed of Bug Detection. 
Dissertation M.Sc. in Computing (Advanced Software Development), Technological University Dublin, 
2019. 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open 
access by the School of Computing at ARROW@TU 
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations 
by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. 
For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
Augmenting American Fuzzy Lop to 
Increase the Speed of Bug Detection 
 
 
Raviraj Mahajan 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
 requirements of Dublin Institute of Technology for the degree of 
 M.Sc. in Computing (Advanced Software Development) 
 
 
2019 
i 
 
 Declaration 
 
 
I certify that this dissertation which I now submit for examination for the award 
of MSc. in Computing (Advanced Software Development), is entirely my own 
work and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that 
such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work. 
 
This dissertation was prepared according to the regulations for postgraduate 
study of the Dublin Institute of Technology and has not been submitted in 
whole or part for an award in any other Institute or University. 
 
The work reported on in this dissertation conforms to the principles and 
requirements of the Institutes guidelines for ethics in research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: ……………………. 
  Raviraj Mahajan 
Date:   03 January 2019 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 
Whitebox fuzz testing is a vital part of the software testing process in the software 
development life cycle (SDLC). It is used for bug detection and security 
vulnerability checking as well. But current tools lack the ability to detect all the 
bugs and cover the entire code under test in a reasonable time. This study will 
explore some of the various whitebox fuzzing techniques and tools (AFL, SAGE, 
Driller, etc.) currently in use followed by a discussion of their strategies and the 
challenges facing them.  
One of the most popular state-of-the-art fuzzers, American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) will 
be discussed in detail and the modifications proposed to reduce the time required 
by it while functioning under QEMU emulation mode will be put forth. The study 
found that the AFL fuzzer can be sped up by injecting an intermediary layer of 
code in the Tiny Code Generator (TCG) that helps in translating blocks between 
the two architectures being used for testing. The modified version of AFL was 
able to find a mean 1.6 crashes more than the basic AFL running in QEMU mode.  
The study will then recommend future research avenues in the form of hybrid 
techniques to resolve the challenges faced by the state of the art fuzzers and create 
an optimal fuzzing tool. The motivation behind the study is to optimize the fuzzing 
process in order to reduce the time taken to perform software testing and produce 
robust, error-free software products.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: software testing, greybox, fuzzing, debugging, program 
verification, symbolic execution, software security, software validation  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Software is made by people and people make mistakes (Lagus 2013). Most 
engineers consider “program verification research” as a typically theoretical 
pursuit having limited impact in the real world. Think again. Almost every piece 
of high-quality software has undergone rigorous tests before it is released. The 
Windows O/S itself adds up to a billion people affected by this field (Godefroid, 
Levin, & Molnar, 2012). Moreover, malware infections that prey on undiscovered 
bugs have increased at an alarming rate: five-fold in the past five years (Moser, 
Kruegel, & Kirda, 2007). It is essential to stay one step ahead.  
Before the Internet became mainstream, not much attention was paid to 
vulnerabilities since making most of the limited resources was considered 
paramount (Lagus 2013, 30). According to Lagus (2013, 31), another issue with 
software vulnerabilities is the fact that security is often taken into consideration in 
the final development phases. Additionally, information systems are not simple, 
and they are often connected to other complex information systems (Lagus 2013, 
31).  
According to Bhat (2015, 23), software testing is highly complex, yet, an 
imperative element of any software development life cycle. Software testing 
should be started as early as possible (Bhat 2015, 23); however, the costs of testing 
are high and Godefroid et al. (2008, 30) point out that usually testing accounts for 
about half of the R&D budget of many software development organizations. 
Myers, Sandler & Badgett (2011, 5) state that in an ideal world every possible 
permutation of a program would be tested. However, in most cases that would not 
be possible or would need hundreds or thousands of possible input and output 
combinations and making test cases for all the combinations would be unfeasible 
(Myers et al. 2011, 5). Positive testing is used to confirm that the software works 
as it is supposed to whereas in negative testing, there is an effort to break the 
software (Bhat 2015, 24). 
2 
 
This is where fuzz testing comes into the picture. It is an integral part of the 
software testing process in the software development life cycle. The term fuzz 
testing or fuzzing is commonly used to refer to techniques which test programs 
through the generation of randomized input data and then running the program 
with those inputs (Ognawala et al., 2017). Fuzzing can be utilized to test 
applications where the space of conceivable sources of input is expansive. The 
system is utilized to perceive how well an application treats invalid inputs and, in 
this manner, uncover bugs. The aim of fuzzing is to traverse the maximum number 
of program paths and detect bugs that may present themselves as assertion 
violations, buffer overflows or program crashes (Pak, 2012). Better coverage of 
code for detection of bugs will result in more robust, error-free and secure software 
products. 
Fuzzing has only one goal, to make the system crash (Takanen et al. 2008, 25). 
With fuzzing a large numbers of boundary cases are tested by either developers or 
quality assurance teams (Oehlert 2005, 58). The prime targets for fuzzing are input 
files, configuration or registry entries, APIs, user interfaces, network interfaces, 
database entries or command line arguments (Oehlert 2005, 59). Shapiro (2011, 
58) points out that the fuzzing triggers race conditions, failures to check return 
code, buffer overflows and format or printf string issues.  
At the structural level, fuzzing finds underflows, repetition of elements and 
unexpected elements (Takanen et al. 2008, 27). At the sequence level, fuzzing 
finds out of sequence or omitted unexpected repetition or spamming of messages 
(Takanen et al. 2008, 27). Fuzzing can also be a part of vulnerability analysis 
where fuzzing is used as a black box technique without the need of source code 
(Takanen et al. 2008, 102). Also whitebox fuzzing can be performed (Godefroid 
et al. 2012, 44).  
The trade-offs between whitebox and blackbox fuzzing are different, because 
blackbox fuzzing is simple, easy, lightweight and fast; however, may offer only 
limited code coverage (Godefroid et al. 2012, 44). Whitebox fuzzing is more 
compound but cleverer (Godefroid et al. 2012, 44). For the discovery of bugs, 
Godefroid et al. (2012, 44) point out that competence of either whitebox or black 
box fuzzing varies according to the software under testin.  
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A simple blackbox fuzzing is a good start if an application has never been fuzzed 
and after those bugs have been found it is time to use whitebox fuzzing (Godefroid 
et al. 2012, 44). The effectiveness of fuzzing bases on measuring how well fuzzing 
covers the input space of the tested interfaces and how good the used inputs are 
(Takanen et al. 2008, 27–28). Fuzzers that only generate random data-based inputs 
are unsuccessful and find only naive coding errors (Takanen et al. 2008, 28). 
Godefroid et al. (2008, 32) point out that the fuzzer’s ability to find errors along 
low probability paths are limited. Above all fuzzing is about test automation to its 
fullest extent (Takanen et al. 2008, 136). 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
Although fuzzing is helpful, no algorithm or technique has been able to provide a 
solution to comprehensively detect all bugs in the code by covering the entire code 
in a realistic time frame and with realistic computing power. 
Fuzzing has several challenges: 
1.2.1. Where to fuzz 
One of the central issues to achieve deep penetration of the program is to know 
where to fuzz. Some parts of a binary are known to be more prone to bugs than 
others.  It becomes important that the fuzzer be directed towards problem areas of 
the binary more often.  
 
1.2.2. Seed Inputs or well-formed inputs 
Another central issue is to determine the right inputs so that no time is wasted on 
inputs that will be rejected or lead to paths already traced. Inputs directly determine 
the paths and also the ability to trigger the bugs lying in those paths.  
Böhme et al. (2016) states: 
Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing (CGF) would clearly 
benefit from a smart seed selection if many seed files are 
available. (pp 1041). 
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This highlights the need for a smart seed generator. The challenge here is that 
constraint solvers in symbolic analysis do not return soon and hence achieve 
incomplete code coverage under limited time (Ognawala, Hutzelmann, Psallida, 
& Pretschner, 2017). 
 
1.2.3. Penetration 
The fuzzer should be able to traverse deep into the program. Otherwise it will only 
be able to detect surface bugs as is the case in most blackbox fuzzers (Godefroid 
et al., 2012). Path explosion as discussed earlier is the main challenge to deep 
penetration.  
 
1.2.4. Full Code Coverage 
Inputs and fuzzer logic should complement each other in a way not only to traverse 
deep but also to be able to cover maximum code possible. It is possible there might 
be severe bugs in a component of the program that was expected to be bug-free. 
 
1.2.5. Manual Input 
The best well-formed inputs are still generated manually. Manual input can be 
error prone if the programmer is inexperienced. Although, AFL was able to 
recreate meaningful input files from an empty file, that does not translate to 
effective input seeds (Böck, 2015). Creating tests manually is expensive, error-
prone and most of the time inconclusive (Burnim, 2008). 
 
However, the most important constraint when it comes to software testing is time. 
Given unlimited time, any software can be tested to be completely bug free. But 
this is not the case. The immense complexity of the latest software products would 
require an unfeasible amount of time for all execution paths to be fuzzed to 
exhaustion. There is a need to speed up the fuzzing process.  
 
5 
 
1.3 Research Question 
 
The research conducted aims to investigate the following research question: 
 
Can implementing an intermediate layer in the tiny code generator of the American 
Fuzzy Lop fuzzer improve its speed significantly? 
 
To elaborate, this study will assess whether the speed of the fuzzing process under 
emulation mode of the AFL fuzzer can be improved significantly by introducing 
an intermediate layer in the tiny code generator to help the translation of transfer 
blocks between the source and the target architectures.  
 
1.4 Research Objective 
 
This research intents to investigate the state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques and any 
improvement that can be made. This will be done be conducting an experiment by 
testing benchmark binaries with known bugs. The AFL fuzzer will be modified 
and compared against the baseline AFL fuzzer. The objective is to improve the 
fuzzer’s performance under the QEMU (Quick Emulator) emulation mode. The 
study will also provide the results and conclusion for additional research and 
studies in the future. It is expected that this study will add to the knowledge in the 
information security area specially the field of software testing and lead to more 
safe and robust software products. The research objectives are: 
• To assess related studies which have made contributions in the field of 
fuzzing. Various studies in the past and their findings will be collected and 
studied carefully. 
• To test the efficiency of current state of the art fuzzers like AFL. 
• To test if an intermediate layer in the tiny code generator to help the 
translation of transfer blocks between the source and the target 
architectures leads to faster performance or not. 
• To test if the modified fuzzer reveals previously unknown bugs.  
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• To recommend further avenues of research that could help improving 
fuzzing techniques and their performance. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The main aim of this research is to determine whether the modified AFL fuzzer 
can detect bugs faster than the normal AFL under QEMU mode. This will 
require a quantitative analysis to be undertaken.  
To accomplish this, an experiment will be conducted to test the performances 
of the individual fuzzers. The test subjects will be ten different binaries which 
are commonly used as benchmarks for testing fuzzing techniques. Each binary 
will be tested for one hour with both the fuzzers. The results will then be 
compared using a paired t-test evaluation to check if any significant difference 
in performance was achieved.  
 
1.6 Scope and Limitation 
 
Fuzz testing is an integral part of the software testing process in the software 
development life cycle. The term fuzz testing or fuzzing is commonly used to refer 
to techniques which test programs through the generation of randomized input 
data and then running the program with those inputs (Ognawala et al., 2017). The 
aim of fuzzing is to traverse the maximum number of program paths and detect 
bugs that may present themselves as assertion violations, buffer overflows or 
program crashes (Pak, 2012). Better coverage of code for detection of bugs will 
result in more robust, error-free and secure software products. 
The limitation here is that only QEMU mode of the AFL fuzzer is being modified, 
the performance under normal mode will not be affected. Also, only ten binaries 
are being tested each for only one hour due to time and resource limitations.  
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1.7 Document Outline 
Chapter 2; Literature Review: This chapter explores fuzzing and its role in the 
SDLC. It further discusses the state-of-the-art fuzzers and their strengths and 
limitations and challenges in the field of automated software testing 
 
Chapter 3; Experiment Design and Methodology: This chapter explains the 
working of AFL fuzzer and outlines the modifications made in an attempt to 
improve its performance. It delineates the experiment to take place. 
 
Chapter 4; Implementation, Results and Analysis: This chapter discusses the 
precise steps in the experiment. It contains the results and their analysis using a 
paired t-test.  
 
Chapter 5; Conclusion: This chapter expounds on the results and delineates the 
limitations of the experiment conducted. It also mentions the future research 
ideas in order to further enhance the fuzzing process.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The chapter provides a brief but detailed review of relevant literature concerning 
the current approaches to detecting vulnerabilities. An overview of fuzzing 
including the need for fuzzing, different types of fuzzers and their strategies are 
included. The state of the art fuzzers and their advantages and disadvantages are 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Modern methods for discovering programming vulnerabilities can be partitioned 
right off the bat into two distinct methodologies; static analysis and dynamic 
analysis. Static analysis of programming includes methods for looking at the 
source code or a binary that is compiled without executing it. Dynamic 
investigation includes inspecting the software at runtime, commonly subsequent 
to connecting some sort of debugger to it. Both approaches have their relative 
advantages and disadvantages (Shoshitaishvili, 2016).  
For static analysis, several automated tools exist that can be combined with 
manual code review by a skilled analyst. The less sophisticated tools essentially 
just scan the target source code looking for known dangerous functions such as 
strcpy() in C programs. The more advanced tools often work using some sort of 
taint analysis (Dahse, 2014). These tools will distinguish and 'taint' any variable 
that has its value set from info that enters the objective application from a client. 
This tainted input and its impact on other information will at that point be 
followed as it passes through the source code. At whatever point it is seen that 
corrupted information could come to a 'sink' or conceivably unsafe function this 
will be hailed for further examination. Static analysis, although useful, often 
produces many false positives that cannot be exploited in practice and requires 
a lot of manual verification work to identify which issues are genuine 
vulnerabilities (Dahse, 2014). It does, however, allow for complete code 
coverage with the entire application being inspected. 
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In the case of dynamic analysis, the most common automated method for 
discovery of vulnerabilities is the method of fuzz testing or fuzzing. 
Essentially this consists of repeatedly giving an application invalid input and 
monitoring for any sign of this triggering a bug, such as the application 
crashing or hanging (Gadi, 2007). There are numerous advantages to this 
methodology, for example, the simplicity of automation and the capacity to 
test even extensive applications where code survey would be too tedious. 
Moreover, each bug found by fuzzing naturally accompanies its own 'proof 
of concept' experiment demonstrating that the bug can be activated by a client. 
Fuzzing is the primary method used nowadays to detect high profile 
vulnerabilities.  
The motivation behind fuzzing and any research pertaining to techniques for 
finding vulnerabilities, can be offensive or defensive. Software organizations 
utilize these procedures to recognize vulnerabilities in their own products and 
is considered an integral part of the Software Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC). Whitehat security specialists likewise utilize these strategies to 
discover vulnerabilities in both open source and restrictive software and 
inform the software developers about the vulnerabilities to allow them to be 
able to release a patch.  
But various intelligence agencies, defense contractors, and even organized 
criminals are known to use these techniques for malicious purposes. These 
organizations benefit from keeping the discovered vulnerabilities to 
themselves and even exploiting them if need be. 
 
2.2. Types of fuzzing:  
Fuzzing is classified into two main types as discussed below: 
 
2.2.1. Black-box fuzzing  
Traditional fuzzing is called black box fuzzing. This is the simplest form of 
fuzzing and assumes that the input as well as output of the SUT (System Under 
Test) are the only things the fuzzer knows. The internal working of the SUT is 
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not known, hence making it a black-box. For instance, in a network protocol, 
both the server-side and client-side code could be fuzzed for vulnerabilities 
(Takanen, Demott, & Miller, 2008). An aggressor could leave the fuzzing 
procedure running until the point that a bug is uncovered. Since protocol 
implementations may be the same on numerous servers, an assailant could set 
up a similar framework to run the fuzzing procedure against. In the event that 
a bug is found, it can in principle, be misused on each server running a similar 
implementation of that protocol. 
 
2.2.2. White-box fuzzing  
White-box fuzzing, on the other hand, utilizes program analysis to know the 
effect of the input and increment code coverage of the SUT. White-box fuzzing 
exploits its access to the source code and design particulars of the SUT. 
Symbolic execution is very connected to white-box fuzzing and is a method for 
deciding how inputs propagate different paths when the program executes. 
When symbolic execution is performed, input variables are assigned symbolic 
values rather than concrete values. All changes to the symbolic value are stored 
and taken into account later when an if statement is reached. This empowers 
the symbolic execution to set the symbolic values such as to take a specific 
path according to the changes to the symbolic value. While symbolic execution 
takes place, constraints can be stored. The constraints are assembled from 
conditional paths of execution experienced along the execution, invalidated, 
and solved utilizing a constraint solver. The output of the solver is then used to 
create new input variables. These input variables are then used to find new 
paths or uncover security risks or bugs. In the development of Windows 7, 
white-box fuzzing was primarily implemented and found one-third of the total 
vulnerabilities found prior to the release (Bounimova, Godefroid, & Molnar, 
2013).  
 
2.2.3. Grey-box fuzzing  
The term grey-box fuzzing coined in 2007 by Demott, Enbody and Punch. 
Despite being bound to only provide input and only be able to look at the output 
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of the SUT, black-box fuzzers can still be smart in the way they generate inputs, 
and therefore achieve high code coverage without suffering from problems in 
scalability (Kargen & Shahmehri, 2015) (Rawat et al., 2017).  Although black-
box fuzzing can achieve high code coverage, the lack of knowledge of the 
working of the SUT makes it difficult to execute certain paths. White-box 
fuzzing is able to solve this issue using symbolic execution. Grey-box fuzzers 
are known to use symbolic execution as well as implementing dynamic taint 
analysis. They combine the best of both worlds and most state of the art fuzzers 
are considered to be of the grey-box variety. 
 
Some of the state of the art fuzzers are discussed below: 
A. SAGE – the first symbolic execution based whitebox fuzzer 
Prior to 2008, blackbox fuzzing was the norm for software testing. It is a form 
of blackbox random testing where randomly mutated well-formed inputs are 
run on the program under test. In some cases, grammars are implemented to 
create the inputs based on application-specific knowledge (Bounimova, 
Godefroid, & Molnar, 2013). Although blackbox fuzzing was effective, it 
provided very low code coverage. Consider the following conditional 
statement as put forth by Bounimova et al. (2013): 
 
int foo(int x) { 
 /
/ x is an input 
int y = x + 3; 
if (y == 13) abort(); // error 
return 0; 
} 
This only has a 1 in 232 chance of being accessed since the input variable x 
would have a randomly-allocated 32-bit value. This low code coverage meant 
many bugs were not detected.  
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In 2008, Patrice Godefroid, Michael Y. Levin and David Molnar implemented 
symbolic execution and dynamic test generation to give rise to the whitebox 
fuzzing tool, SAGE (Scalable, Automated, Guided Execution). This algorithm 
could dynamically create randomly mutated input variables based on 
constraints in the program under test. This way the well-formed inputs were 
able to access more paths in the program allowing for more code coverage.  
SAGE was credited with finding roughly one third of all the bugs during the 
development of Microsoft’s Windows 7. However, majority of the test time 
was spent in the discovery of the appropriate inputs which was done manually 
by a skilled programmer. SAGE set the stage for further research to overcome 
its drawbacks. 
 
B. TaintScope 
TaintScope, built on the symbolic execution engine mentioned in SAGE, is a 
fuzzer that “can symbolically evaluate a trace, reason about all possible values 
that can execute the trace, and then detect potential vulnerabilities on the trace” 
(Wang, Wei, Gu, & Zou, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.2.3.1 – Validating inputs using checksum integrity checks (Wang et 
al., 2010). 
As observed in figure 1, it uses checksum verification to verify the integrity of 
the mutated well-formed inputs, saving a lot of time by getting rid of 
malformed inputs. It also intelligently focuses on modifying those bits of the 
input that can mostly result in triggering exceptions in the program.  
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TaintScope was able to find 27 bugs that were previously unknown in many 
widely used applications, including Microsoft Paint, Google Picasa, 
ImageMagick, and Adobe Acrobat. 
 
C. American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) 
AFL is a well-known open source, off-the-shelf fuzzer first developed in 2014 
and has been updated regularly making it a benchmark for most novel 
algorithms being researched. Some of the enhancements made to AFL are 
credited to scientists incorporating their fuzzing techniques into AFL (Stephens 
et al.,2016) (Bohme, 2016), which is a strong indication that AFL can be 
considered one of, or even, the foremost grey-box fuzzer currently.   
It emphasizes unique code coverage i.e. creating inputs that trace paths that 
have not been accessed before (Zalewski, 2014). Another noteworthy feature 
of AFL is that it keeps a record of all the loops that it gets into and decides in 
the end which would be most important path to trace for a particular loop, 
thereby reducing the time complexity from N2 to log(N) (Stephens et al., 2016).  
A demonstration of AFL entailed using a bogus file as input to fuzz 
the djpeg tool that comes with libjpeg. As time passed, the fuzzer 
automatically created a new input file with a valid JPEG header (Böck, 2015). 
This means that smart fuzzers can operate without any seed input.  
 
D. Driller 
Driller, a fuzzing tool developed at UC Santa Barbara last year, builds on the 
AFL. It uses the complimenting strengths of fuzzing and symbolic execution 
to allay their respective drawbacks. In SAGE, symbolic execution led to the 
path explosion problem where too many possible paths are generated. A trade-
off had to be made between time and code coverage (Bounimova et al., 2013). 
Also, a lot of time was spent on manually creating inputs. 
Driller solves these issues by using concolic execution to split the program into 
compartments and then use fuzzing to drill deep into the program by using 
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valid inputs crafted by the concolic execution engine (Stephens et al., 2016).     
Tests were performed on 126 binaries using AFL and Driller. AFL found 66 
bugs while Driller was able to find 72 bugs (Stephens et al., 2016).    
  
E. AFLFast 
AFLFast is a state of the art fuzzing tool that, as the name suggests, is an 
augmentation on AFL that implements Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing 
(CGF). CGF combines whitebox and blackbox fuzzing as it doesn’t need any 
program analysis to generate seed inputs. Instead of symbolic execution, it uses 
Markov chains to recognize paths that are not being frequently traced by the 
fuzzer. This improves code coverage without requiring additional time for 
input generation. 
It was able to find more bugs in lesser time as compared to off-the-shelf AFL 
(Böhme, Pham, & Roychoudhury, 2016). 
 
F. Neural Byte Sieve 
Rajpal, Blum and Singh (2017) developed a technique to use neural networks 
to discover and learn patterns in the input files by studying previous fuzzing 
runs. These patterns can then be leveraged to predict optimal locations to 
perform future fuzzing using the right mutations.  
They implemented this in AFL and were able to demonstrate significant 
enhancements in terms of code coverage and unique code path traces. 
  
2.3 Discussion 
Ever since SAGE (Godefroid et al.,2012) there has been a race to develop better 
automated seed inputs or better fuzzer logic to overcome the challenges. The 
primary strength of grey-box fuzzing is that it functions without requiring the 
source code of the SUT. This is advantageous for the testing and security 
verification of third-party softwares (DeMott, 2007). Since grey-box fuzzing is 
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based on the lightweight black-box fuzzing technique, but may still glean 
information about the SUT, code coverage can still be leveraged without 
sacrificing time on program analysis (Bayer et al., 2006). Grey-box fuzzing, 
however, is unsuitable for conditions when the internals of the software cannot 
be accessed. 
 
The state of the art is to combine lightweight blackbox/greybox fuzzers with 
whitebox fuzzers that employ symbolic execution to combine the strengths of 
both and minimize each other’s drawbacks. They build a program model 
automatically as it is tested, allowing for optimal guidance of the fuzzer. For 
example, HybridFuzz (Pak, 2012) first runs symbolic execution to create inputs 
that lead to “frontier nodes” which are then used by a blackbox fuzzer. In 
contrast, Driller starts with AFL and turns to symbolic execution when it “gets 
stuck”, for example, to generate a magic number (Stephens et al., 2016). 
Whereas AFLFast uses Markov Chains for the same (Böhme et al., 2016).  
 
Time is an important constraint when it comes to software testing. Grey-box 
fuzzers are more non-specific than white-box fuzzers. Since white-box fuzzers 
take into consideration the source code, information about the language’s 
syntax is essential to perform the analysis. Hence it can be difficult to test 
software’s that use multiple languages or those whose language is unknown to 
the fuzzer. Grey-box fuzzers unlike black-box fuzzers can automatically learn 
to generate valid inputs which eliminates the need to have seed inputs. By not 
being dependent on valid seed inputs that have the purpose of taking the 
execution away from branches that only lead to exception handling in the 
parser code, grey-box fuzzers can be automated in a more sophisticated matter 
than black-box fuzzers. 
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3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, the challenges faced by fuzzing were discussed. Time being 
one of the primary ones. In this chapter, the basic working of American Fuzzy 
Lop (AFL) fuzzer will be discussed followed by the modifications proposed 
and their effect on the fuzzing process. A quantitative experiment will be 
discussed in this chapter that compares the basic AFL to the modified version 
which is expected to improve the runtime and hence speed up bug detection.  
 
3.2 Why American Fuzzy Lop? 
An effective fuzzing framework comprises of more than just a method to create 
and pass invalid inputs to the software being tested. Some method for 
instrumenting the software is required so as to screen what is happening inside as 
each case is handled. Exceptions, crashes and other unexpected behavior must be 
identified and additionally logged and answered to the client alongside as much 
information as would be essential for further manual examination. There must 
likewise be a test harness that can restart the application automatically as required 
so that the fuzzing effort can run unsupervised. 
In Franz (2010) and Vimpari (2015), several prevalent free fuzzing tools are 
assessed and compared to each other. This work outlines well that there are a wide 
range of sorts of fuzzers and they are appropriate for various circumstances. There 
is no single tool that gives the best results in each circumstance. 
For the experiment, an open source state of the art fuzzer called the American 
Fuzzy Lop as discussed in last chapter will be implemented. 
American Fuzzy Lop Fuzzer or AFL is a well-known open source, off-the-shelf 
fuzzer first developed in 2014 and has been updated regularly making it a 
benchmark for most novel algorithms being researched. Some of the 
enhancements made to AFL are credited to scientists incorporating their fuzzing 
techniques into AFL (Stephens et al.,2016) (Bohme, 2016), which is a strong 
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indication that AFL can be considered one of, or even, the foremost grey-box 
fuzzer currently.  Hence, AFL was chosen to be augmented.  
 
3.3 How AFL works? 
 
AFL Fuzzer is a security focused brute-force fuzzer that can be used either in 
compile time instrumentation mode or in traditional blind fuzzer mode (Zalewski, 
2016). Instrumentation can be either done either while compiling or by the use of 
QEMU hypervisor (Stephens et al. 2016). American Fuzzy Lop employs a altered 
form of edge coverage in order to pick up small, local-scale changes to program 
control flow (Zalewski, 2016). Input generation is done by a genetic algorithm, 
mutating inputs based on the genetics inspired rules and ranking them by a fitness 
function (Stephens et al. 2016). Fitness functions base on unique code coverage 
where an execution path is triggered, which is different from the paths triggered 
by other inputs (Stephens et al. 2016). Union of control flow transitions, which 
American Fuzzy Lop has seen from its inputs, such as tuples of the source and 
destination basic blocks are tracked by American Fuzzy Lop (Stephens et al. 
2016).  
The inputs that make an application execute in a different way get prioritized in 
the generation of future inputs (Stephens et al., 2016). In order to reduce the size 
of the path spaces for loops, American Fuzzy Lop uses a heuristic approach where 
only log(N) paths are taken into account for each loop instead of N paths (Stephens 
et al., 2016). Randomization of the programs interferes with the genetic fuzzer’s 
evaluation of inputs because an input, which produces interesting paths under a 
certain random seed may not do so under another random seed (Stephens et al., 
2016). If randomization is not removed, the fuzzing component is likely to explore 
only few paths, but if constant randomness is used, then the program accepts the 
same input each time and that allows the fuzzer to find this value and subsequently 
explore further (Stephens et al., 2016).  
The process of American Fuzzy Lop is to load user-supplied initial test cases into 
the queue, then take next input file from the queue, attempt to trim the test case to 
the smallest size, which will not change the measured behavior of the system under 
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test, mutate the file repeatedly by using a variety of traditional fuzzing strategies 
and if any of the generated mutations caused new state transitions that were 
recorded by the instrumentation, new entry of the mutated output is added to the 
queue and then the algorithm takes next input file from the queue and repeats 
(Zalewski, 2016).  
 
Figure 3.3.1 The UI of AFL 
If instrumentation is to be used, the fuzzed program has to be instrumented with 
aflgcc (Zalewski, 2016). The instrumentation will also display the number of 
locations that were instrumented, as seen in Figure 3.3.2.  
  
 
Figure 3.3.2 UI showing instrumented locations 
During instrumentation assembly code is injected to the target program that is used 
to trace executions paths as new inputs are entered (Margaritelli, 2015). Injected 
assembly code is also used to determine if known or unknown execution paths is 
triggered by a new mutation input (Margaritelli, 2015). When fuzzing with 
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instrumented code, last new path should show the time when last new path was 
found like in Figure 3.3.3 (Zalewski, 2016). 
 
Figure 3.3.3 Running AFL withs instrumented code. 
The disparity between instrumented and non-instrumented afl-fuzzing can be seen 
using a simple program that is known to have only one unique crash. Non-
instrumented fuzzing shows total paths as 1 and total crashes to be 0. On the other 
hand, performing fuzzing with instrumentation, the total paths were found to be 5 
and total crashes were 63 with only 1 unique.  
American Fuzzy Lop fuzzes until Ctrl-C is pressed but at least one queue cycle 
should be completed before fuzzing is stopped (Zalewski, 2016). Completing one 
queue cycle may take from seconds to even a week (Zalewski, 2016). The fuzzing 
is performed by afl-fuzz utility that requires a read-only directory with initial test 
cases, a directory to store results and path to the binary to be fuzzed (Zalewski, 
2016).  
For example, when command  
./afl-fuzz -i input1 -o output1 /home/virtual/Ravi/afl-
1.92b/a.out  
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is used, the -i parameter points out to a directory with initial test cases and -o 
parameter points out to a directory to store the fuzzing results (Zalewski, 2016).  
American Fuzzy Lop comes with sample test cases containing small standalone 
files that can be used to seed afl-fuzz (Zalewski, 2016). The archives directory has, 
among others, samples of rar, tar and zip (Zalewski, 2016). Images directory has, 
among others, samples of bmp, jpeg and png (Zalewski, 2016). Multimedia 
directory has a sample of h264 and others directory has among others samples of 
js, pdf, rtf and text files (Zalewski, 2016). These will be used as benchmarks for 
the experiment.  
The directory to store results will have three subdirectories that are updated in real 
time (Zalewski, 2016). Queue directory has test cases for every distinctive 
execution paths and the starting files given by the user (Zalewski, 2016). Crashes 
directory has unique test cases that caused the program to receive a fatal signal 
and the entries are grouped by the received signal (Zalewski, 2016). Hangs 
directory has unique test cases that cause the tested program to time out (Zalewski, 
2016).  
American Fuzzy Lop considers crashes and hangs unique if the associated 
execution paths involve any state transitions that have not been seen in previously 
recorded faults (Zalewski, 2016). Crash is considered unique if the crash trace 
includes not seen a tuple in any of the previous crashes or if the crash trace is 
missing a tuple that was present every time in earlier faults (Zalewski, 2016).  
In order to ease crash analysis American Fuzzy Lop fuzzer has a crash exploration 
mode where a crashed test case is provided as an input and American Fuzzy Lop 
uses its genetic algorithms to see how far can be reached within the instrumented 
codebase while the program is kept in the crashing state (Zalewski, 2016). Figure 
3.3.4 shows an example where the crashes are being used as inputs, though, only 
one unique crash is recognized by the fuzzer. 
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Figure 3.3.4. Fuzzing with a failing test code as input. 
American Fuzzy Lop produces a coverage-based grouping of crashes that can be 
triaged manually or use GDB scripts to analyze (Zalewski, 2016). Also, every 
crash can be traced to its parent non-crashing test case in the queue, which should 
make it easier to detect faults (Zalewski, 2016). Zalewski (2016) points out that 
some crashes produced by fuzzing can be fairly difficult to evaluate for 
exploitability without substantial work in debugging and code analysis.  
 
3.4   Instrumenting binary-only apps 
 
When the source code is unavailable, AFL offers some experimental support for 
fast, convenient instrumentation of binaries that are black-box. This is carried out 
with a form of QEMU running in the "user space emulation" mode. According to 
Zalewski (2016), this mode is about 2-5x slower compared to compile-time 
instrumentation, is less prone to parallelization, and may present some other quirks 
as well. 
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Full system testing is difficult to achieve because most testing tools do not have 
full access to the lower levels of the software stack. To address this issue, 
virtualization technology is frequently used in full system testing tools. One such 
virtualization technology is QEMU (Quick Emulator). It is an open source 
emulator software that carries out hardware simulation. 
QEMU’s aim is to emulate a target on top of a host, each having different or 
similar architectures. A simple technique would be to code an interpreter for the 
target’s instruction set followed by compiling it on the host system. However, this 
is a very time-consuming endeavour. A smarter method is just-in-time 
compilation: interpret the target’s code to the native host instructions and then 
execute at native speed which is accomplished by QEMU automatically. 
 
3.5 Tiny Code Generator Modification 
 
This raises another issue, translating directly from target to host is not able to scale 
well, as it would require translators for all the target and host tuples. This can be 
solved by introducing an indirection layer, Tiny Code Generator (TCG).  
A TCG front-end takes native target instructions and puts them into an 
architecture-independent intermediate representation (IR). A TCG back-end then 
casts the IR into the native host’s instructions. A new targer architecture then only 
requires the programmer to write a new front end while a new host architecture 
would require only a new backend. This immensely lowers the manual work 
required to carry out the fuzzing.  
The translation is done while running during emulation at the elementary block 
level. Since translation is resource intensive, translation blocks (TBs) are kept in 
the TCG cache, where from they can be called if they are executed again. 
An important issue to take into consideration here is that the memory layout of the 
code that was translated would not always be a match for the original code. 
References to memory addresses also need to be fixed.  
For example, the control-flow instruction that would terminate a block. If it is a 
direct jump then the address of the destination is already known, so it can be 
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directly corrected, and the jump can then be translated into a native jump onto the 
inheritor, resulting in a zero runtime overhead. QEMU calls this 
phenomenon block chaining. In the case of an indirect jump, however, the 
destination cannot be determined at the time of translation. In such a case, the jump 
can be translated to a call back to the QEMU’s core, which will then consequently 
translate the destination block and transfer control to it, thus continuing the 
emulation. Clearly, this will have a performance price. 
AFL, being a coverage-guided fuzzer, needs a tracing instrumentation to collect 
information about the program’s control flow (Biondo, 2018). If you have the 
program’s source code, you can recompile it using AFL’s instrumenting compiler, 
which will add a small snippet to the beginning of every basic block. When you 
only have a binary, you can use AFL’s QEMU mode: the binary runs within a 
patched QEMU that collects coverage information and delivers it to AFL (Biondo, 
2018). 
QEMU patches in AFL function as follows: 
The qemu_mode/patches/afl-qemu-cpu-inl.h file contains the actual 
implementation. This has two main components: the forkserver and the tracing 
instrumentation (Biondo, 2018). The forkserver is AFL’s method to optimize the 
initialization overhead as discussed. The forkserver starts before the program is 
run and hence the children always have a vacant TCG cache (Biondo, 2018). 
Therefore, there’s a technique by which children notify the parent of the newly 
translated blocks, leading the parent to translate the block within its own cache for 
upcoming children. 
The instrumentation part then calls the accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c in the QEMU core. 
Specifically, this patch inserts a snippet of code into cpu_tb_exec, which is called 
whenever a TB is executed by the emulator. The patch calls afl_maybe_log, which 
holds the responsibility to check whether the block resides within the traced 
bounds and, if so, the control flow transfer is traced into AFL’s edge map. 
This gives rise to an issue, the jumps in the chained blocks will be unable to call 
back into the emulator and therefore, it won’t go through cpu_tb_exec. AFL 
provides a siolution to this is disabling chaining: 
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setenv("QEMU_LOG", "nochain", 1); 
However, this causes it to function very slowly since direct jumps are not being 
traced at all.  
TCG Instrumentation: 
The idea is to handover the instrumentation into the translated code by adding a 
small snippet of TCG IR at the start of every TB. By doing this, the instrumentation 
becomes a part of the emulated software, thus eliminating the need to go back into 
the emulator at each block allowing us to re-enable chaining in order to reduce the 
time required.  
 
The function afl_maybe_log exists in the file qemu_mode/patches/afl-qemu-cpu-
inl.h: 
 
/* This is the same as the tuple logging function from afl-
as.h. */ 
static inline void afl_maybe_log(abi_ulong cur_loc) { 
  static __thread abi_ulong prev_loc; 
  /* Optimize for cur_loc > afl_end_code, only for Linux. */ 
  if (cur_loc > afl_end_code || cur_loc < afl_start_code || 
!afl_area_ptr) 
    return; 
  /* It is seen that QEMU always maps to some fixed locations, 
so ASAN will not be a concern. But the instruction addresses 
may be aligned inadvertently. The value has to be randomized 
to get something quasi-uniform. */ 
  cur_loc  = (cur_loc >> 4) ^ (cur_loc << 8); 
  cur_loc &= MAP_SIZE - 1; 
 
25 
 
  /* Here probabilistic instrumentation is implemented by 
reading the scrambled block address. This will keep the 
instrumented memory locations steady across various runs. */ 
  if (cur_loc >= afl_inst_rms) return; 
  afl_area_ptr[cur_loc ^ prev_loc]++; 
  prev_loc = cur_loc >> 1; 
} 
 
Everything that depends on cur_loc can be done at translation time, as cur_loc is 
the address of the current block. Basically, TCG IR needs to be generated for the 
last two lines. This can be done as follows: 
 
/* Generates TCG code for AFL's tracing instrumentation. */ 
 
static void afl_gen_trace(target_ulong cur_loc) 
{ 
  static __thread target_ulong prev_loc; 
  TCGv index, count, new_prev_loc; 
  TCGv_ptr prev_loc_ptr, count_ptr; 
 
  /* Optimize for cur_loc > afl_end_code, which is the case on Linux systems. */ 
 
  if (cur_loc > afl_end_code || cur_loc < afl_start_code || !afl_area_ptr) 
    return; 
 
26 
 
  /* QEMU always maps to fixed locations, so ASAN is not a concern. But 
instruction addresses may be similar. The value needs to be changed to get a quasi-
uniform value. */ 
 
  cur_loc  = (cur_loc >> 4) ^ (cur_loc << 8); 
  cur_loc &= MAP_SIZE - 1; 
 
  /*  Instrumentation is implemented by observing the scrambled block address as 
this stabilizes the locations across the various runs. */ 
 
  if (cur_loc >= afl_inst_rms) return; 
 
  /* index = prev_loc ^ cur_loc */ 
  prev_loc_ptr = tcg_const_ptr(&prev_loc); 
  index = tcg_temp_new(); 
  tcg_gen_ld_tl(index, prev_loc_ptr, 0); 
  tcg_gen_xori_tl(index, index, cur_loc); 
 
  /* afl_area_ptr[index]++ */ 
  count_ptr = tcg_const_ptr(afl_area_ptr); 
  tcg_gen_add_ptr(count_ptr, count_ptr, TCGV_NAT_TO_PTR(index)); 
  count = tcg_temp_new(); 
  tcg_gen_ld8u_tl(count, count_ptr, 0); 
  tcg_gen_addi_tl(count, count, 1); 
  tcg_gen_st8_tl(count, count_ptr, 0); 
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  /* prev_loc = cur_loc >> 1 */ 
  new_prev_loc = tcg_const_tl(cur_loc >> 1); 
  tcg_gen_st_tl(new_prev_loc, prev_loc_ptr, 0); 
} 
 
 
This should be called before translating each block. The TB IR generation happens 
in tb_gen_code (accel/tcg/translate-all.c), which subsequently calls the target 
frontend’s gen_intermediate_code function: 
 
tcg_ctx.cpu = ENV_GET_CPU(env); 
gen_intermediate_code(cpu, tb); 
tcg_ctx.cpu = NULL; 
 
This needs to be changed to insert the IR before each block: 
 
tcg_ctx.cpu = ENV_GET_CPU(env); 
afl_gen_trace(pc); 
gen_intermediate_code(cpu, tb); 
tcg_ctx.cpu = NULL; 
 
The function setenv("QEMU_LOG", "nochain", 1) has to be removed from the 4 
AFL files: afl-analyze.c, , afl-tmin.c, afl-fuzz.c and afl-showmap.c. 
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3.6 Chain Caching modification 
 
AFL uses a forkserver strategy to decrease and optimize initialization overhead. 
Basically, the forkserver is run after initialization, and it forks off children at 
AFL’s request. Each child then executes a test case. This approach removes 
QEMU’s initialization overhead but can cause TCG cache thrashing since the 
parent, after being initialized, has a vacant TCG cache, thus all the children would 
be starting with an empty cache.  
To circumvent this, AFL’s patches establish a connection between the parent and 
child, which the child uses to alert the parent of each new basic block translation 
that takes place. The parent will then be able to translate the block within its own 
cache thus making it accessible to future children. 
To do this, AFL patches tb_find in accel/tcg/cpu-exec.c by putting a call 
to afl_request_tslafter tb_gen_code, which does the translation of the block. 
The afl_request_tsl function sends the data needed to identify the TB (address, CS 
base and flags) to the parent, that is spinning in afl_wait_tsl. 
Finally, afl_wait_tsl calls the tb_gen_code function to translate the block residing 
in the parent’s cache. 
The tb_find function then receives two parameters, last_tb and tb_exit, which 
identify the previous TB and slot where it jumps of the previous TB’s last 
instruction, which led to the current one. After translating the recieved 
block, tb_find performs the chaining by patching the previous block’s jump slot: 
/* Patching the calling TB. */ 
if (last_tb && !qemu_loglevel_mask(CPU_LOG_TB_NOCHAIN)) { 
    if (!have_tb_lock) { 
        tb_lock(); 
        have_tb_lock = true; 
    } 
    if (!tb->invalid) { 
        tb_add_jump(last_tb, tb_exit, tb); 
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    } 
} 
However, afl_wait_tsl won’t cache the chains between TBs. The implementation 
for caching of the patched jump slots can be found in the appendix. Basically, the 
parent is notified when the tb_add_jump block is reached so the caching can take 
place.  
3.7 Experiment Design 
 
The summary statistics produced by the AFL include the number of bugs found, 
code coverage percentage and time taken among several other relevant parameters. 
A comparison can be made between the number of bugs for the two fuzzer 
configurations tested. This relates directly to the research question. There is 
expected to be a significant rise in both these numbers in the modified AFL fuzzer 
compared to the basic AFL fuzzer. 
The experiment consists of running both versions of the fuzzer on ten common 
benchmark binaries for one hour per binary. The number of bugs found will be 
counted. If the number of bugs found by one version is higher than the other, it 
can be inferred that that particular version of the fuzzer is performing faster than 
the other.  
Several benchmark binaries are provided in the AFL package. The ones chosen 
for the experiment are as follows: 
1. tcpdump 
2. Readelf 
3. nm 
4. objdump 
5. C++filt 
6. xmllint 
7. mutooldraw 
8. djpeg 
9. readpng 
10. strings 
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Statistical analysis can be done for the two configurations of the fuzzer to find the 
mean difference in performance using a paired t-test. If improved performance is 
observed overall in the ten binaries tested, then the hypothesis can be said to have 
been proven unequivocally. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
Time is of the essence. This is true for fuzzing as well. In today’s world with rapid 
software development and quick updates, it is essential that software testing can 
be done as fast as possible. In this chapter, the AFL fuzzer’s inner workings were 
discussed along with the modifications proposed to reduce the time taken to find 
crashes. The experiment design was explained as well. The next step would be to 
perform the experiment and record the results. 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the basic AFL fuzzer and the modified 
version will both be run on ten different binaries and the number of bugs detected, 
code coverage achieved, and time taken for each will be noted. Due to time 
constraints, each binary will be tested only for one hour using both the fuzzers.  
The results will be compared using a paired t-test as detailed in the section 4.3 
below. 
 
4.2 Implementation  
 
The programming language used will be C in a Linux Environment on an x86 
machine with 4 cores.  
The experiment comprises of the following basic steps:  
 
1. First, prime the AFL by initializing it in the QEMU mode.  
2. We run the fuzzer on the ten benchmark binaries selected.  
3. After one hour has passed, the fuzzer’s execution is stopped and the 
number of bugs detected for each of the benchmark binaries are recorded.  
4. Then, the modified version of AFL is initialized in QEMU mode.  
5. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated for this version of the fuzzer.  
6. The observations are tabulated, and a paired t-test is conducted to 
determine whether any significant change has been achieved in the number 
of bugs detected.  
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4.3 Experiment Results 
 
Both fuzzers were run for one hour each on the ten binaries and the number of 
crashes detected was noted down. The following table shows the values 
observed. 
 
Binary Under Test Crashes detected using 
basic AFL 
Crashed detected using 
modified AFL 
tcpdump 12 15 
Readelf 19 21 
nm 6 6 
objdump 8 11 
C++filt 14 16 
xmllint 32 37 
mutooldraw 9 11 
djpeg 8 6 
readpng 17 19 
strings 6 5 
Table 4.2.1. Crashes detected in basic AFL and modified AFL  
The fuzzing benchmarks are derived from real-life libraries that have a wide range 
of bugs and hard-to-find code paths for bug finding tools and are included in the 
AFL package. 
Some examples include jpeg, png, xml, JSON, SSL, etc. The bugs present in these 
binaries are well-documented and hence the fuzzers can be tested to find how 
many of the known bugs were discovered by it and also the different paths 
explored by the fuzzer which can tell us the code coverage achieved. 
 
4.4 Analysis: Paired t-test  
 
This section delineates the technique that will be utilized to dissect the analysis 
results. A paired t-test method will be implemented in this analysis. It is a factual 
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system that is utilized in "before-after‟ studies, case-control study, or coordinated 
sets (Sigma, 2009). It analyses two means that are obtained from a similar subject. 
The point of such sort of test is to decide if the mean difference between the 
observations on an explicit result is significantly different from zero.  
 
In this investigation, the data contains two factors that are tested on the same set 
of variables. The two factors are the basic AFL and the modified AFL and the 
variables are the number of bugs found in the ten binaries under test. By utilizing 
the paired t-test, it becomes clear whether the modifications made to AFL were 
successful in speeding up the fuzzing or not. 
Hypothesis: 
The 'null hypothesis' will be as following: 
H0: There is no significant difference in mean of the number of bugs found by the 
basic AFL and the modified AFL 
And the 'alternative hypothesis' can be defined as: 
H1: There is a significant difference in mean of the number of bugs found by the 
basic AFL and the modified AFL 
 
The results of the paired t-test are as follows:  
P value and statistical significance:  
                              The two-tailed P value equals 0.0368  
Confidence interval:  
The difference in the mean of Modified AFL and Basic AFL minus was found to 
be 1.60  
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Figure 4.4.1. T Distribution of the paired t-test 
 
The 95% confidence interval of this difference was found to be: From -3.08 to -
0.12  
Intermediate values used in calculations:  
  t = 2.4495                               df = 9  
  standard error of difference = 0.653 
 
 
Table 4.4.1. Paired t-test results for Basic AFL vs Modified AFL 
 
 
 Basic AFL Modified AFL 
Mean 13.10 14.70 
SD 8.02 9.60 
SEM 2.54 3.04 
N 10 10 
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4.5 Discussion 
 
According to conventional criteria, a two-tailed P value of 0.0368 is considered to 
be statistically significant. This means that the null hypothesis can be dismissed. 
The mean difference between the the number of bugs discovered was found to be 
1.6 which means the modified AFL fuzzer on average detected more than 1 crash 
per binary more than the basic AFL fuzzer. This may not seem like a big difference 
but fuzzing generally is carried out by extremely powerful computers and for long 
periods of time. Due to time limitations, the study was only able to run the fuzzers 
for an hour making the mean difference of 1.6 quite significant.    
The changes made to AFL significantly improved the performance as expected. 
Simply put, more bugs were found by the modified version in the same amount of 
time. This translated to the fact that the modified AFL runs faster than the basic 
version.  
This decisively proves that adding the TCG IR to help translate the blocks does in 
fact significantly improve the performance of the AFL Fuzzer under QEMU mode 
in terms of speed and bug detection.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
While symbolic execution-based whitebox methodologies have been gaining 
prominence, their scalability is not comparable to that of blackbox or greybox 
fuzzers. Speeding up the greybox fuzzer AFL can help the entire SDLC and error 
free software can be published quickly.  
The study was able to successfully answer the research question:  
 
“Can implementing an intermediate layer in the tiny code 
generator of the American Fuzzy Lop fuzzer improve its speed 
significantly?” 
 
The answer simply put is yes. A more detailed discussion can be 
found in the next section. 
  
5.2 Conclusion 
 
In the experiment conducted, it was observed that the modified AFL fuzzer 
provided better performance in QEMU mode. In the same amount of time, the 
modified fuzzer was consistently able to detect more bugs. The mean difference 
between the bugs discovered was 1.6 which means the modified AFL was able to 
detect atleast one bug more in each of the binaries as compared to the basic AFL 
when run in QEMU mode.  
This conclusively proves that adding the TCG IR to help translate the blocks does 
in fact significantly improve the performance in terms of speed and bug detection. 
The hypothesis was proved to be true. However, the study has certain limitations 
that need to be taken into consideration. These are discussed in the next section. 
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5.2 Limitations 
 
1. Due to time constraints, each binary was tested only for one hour. This may 
give rise to discrepancies as the test can be carried out for weeks to discover 
all the bugs. It is essential to run the tests to completion and note the time 
required to discover all the known bugs in each binary. This will unequivocally 
prove whether the modified AFL fuzzer performs faster than basic AFL or not.  
 
2. More binaries need to be tested to fully gauge the performance difference 
between the two fuzzers. It can be a co-incidence that the ten binaries selected 
gave favourable results.  
 
3. Both fuzzers were run with chain caching enabled. The same experiment can 
be conducted without chain caching to be able to fully comprehend the 
difference in performance. The results may or may not be aligned with the 
findings of this study.  
 
4. Only QEMU mode is affected by the modifications made. They have no 
effect on the basic usage of AFL. The basic AFL in normal mode will still 
give better results than the modified version. 
 
5. Another factor that may affect dependability is the haphazardness in AFL's 
fluffing. Since AFL uses random inputs, the performance is different in each 
run. Several runs need to be conducted to ensure the consistency of the 
results.  
 
6. The limitation here is that only one parameter, the number of bugs 
discovered, is being measured. However, there are more nuances to fuzzing 
that need to be taken into consideration. The time taken to discover all the 
bugs might be high but the fuzzer might be able to discover a majority of the 
bugs in a small amount of time and then take longer to discover the rest. This 
may be important in many applications where time is limited.  
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7. Another limitation is that the fuzzer might work excellently on the ten 
binaries being tested but might not work so well on other programs since 
each piece of software is unique in its structure and build. But these libraries 
have been selected because they are used as the benchmark by scientists 
(Cadar, Pawlowski, Dill & Engler, 2008) (Gligoric et al., 2010). 
 
8. Only one device was used to conduct the experiment. The architecture 
differences on other hardware could create issues in the block chaining 
algorithm. It is important to test on devices with different architectures.  
 
 
5.3 Further Research  
 
Future research can include trying to combat the various challenges by combining 
the best methods discovered so far for each problem area. The following is a 
proposed implementation: 
 
1. Before fuzzing commences, one can implement static program analysis by 
analysing the program control and data flow to produce an input dictionary using 
the strategies delineated by Shastry et al. (2017). This can aid the fuzzer in 
determining the seed inputs that will create the most number of paths thereby 
increasing code coverage.  
2. The fuzzer can then be run for a limited time as a test run to allow the neural byte 
sieve to come up with optimal location for the next fuzzing cycle.  
3. Then Driller’s concolic execution engine can be implemented to split the 
program into compartments and create more paths using steps 1 & 2.  
4. This can be done in conjunction with TaintScope’s checksum verification 
algorithm to select the best mutated input seeds.  
5. Lastly, AFLFast’s algorithms can be used to trace rare paths.  
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Another avenue of research can include implementation of multiple fuzzers and 
running them simultaneously, sharing information with each other, speeding up 
the fuzzing process. As we have observed, contingent on the binary, different 
symbolic executors will be more or less effective and the right one can be chosen 
dynamically to allow for maximum code coverage while reducing duplication by 
marking paths that are traced. 
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